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Abstract The formalism of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) is being
increasingly applied to probabilistic modelling and decision problems in a
widening variety of fields. This method provides the advantages of a formal
probabilistic model, presented in an easily assimilated visual form, together
with the ready availability of efficient computational methods and tools for
exploring model consequences. Here we formulate one BBN model of a part
of the safety assessment task for computer and software based nuclear systems
important to safety. Our model is developed from the perspective of an
independent safety assessor who is presented with the task of evaluating
evidence from disparate sources: the requirement specification and
verification documentation of the system licensee and of the system
manufacturer; the previous reputation of the various participants in the design
process; knowledge of commercial pressures; information about tools and
resources used; and many other sources. Based on these multiple sources of
evidence, the independent assessor is ultimately obliged to make a decision as
to whether or not the system should be licensed for operation within a
particular nuclear plant environment. Our BBN model is a contribution
towards a formal model of this decision problem. We restrict attention to a
part of this problem: the safety analysis of the Computer System Specification
documentation. As with other BBN applications we see this modelling
activity as having several potential benefits. It employs a rigorous formalism
as a focus for examination, discussion, and criticism of arguments about
safety. It obliges the modeller to be very explicit about assumptions
concerning probabilistic dependencies, correlations, and causal relationships.
It allows sensitivity analyses to be carried out. Ultimately we envisage this
BBN, or some later development of it, forming part of a larger model, which
might well take the form of a larger BBN model, covering all sources of
evidence about pre-operational life-cycle stages. This could provide an
integrated model of all aspects of the task of the independent assessor, leading
up to the final judgement about system safety in a particular context. We
expect to offer some results of this further work later in the DeVa project.
Keywords — Combining Evidence, Safety Assessment, Probabilistic Safety
Assessment, Safety Critical Software, Bayesian Belief Networks
1 Introduction
The problem of safety assessment for complex systems involves a large number of variables
and different potential sources of evidence. Many of these variables are inter-related by
dependencies of an experimental, probabilistic and even subjective nature which are not well
understood formally. These two aspects of the safety assessment application make it typical
of the classes of problems to which BBNs have recently been profitably applied. For detailed
previous discussions of the potential of BBNs as a tool for modelling software safety
assessment see e.g. [Delic et al. 1995, Delic et al. 1997], [Neil and Galliers 1997]. In this
paper we apply the formalism of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) to the problem of safety
assessment of nuclear computer-based systems. The BBN formalism, with its easily
assimilable graphical representation for probabilistic dependency models [Pearl 1988], and
with its amenability to efficient computational tools such as Hugin [Andersen et al. 1989],
provides a relatively new and attractive method of constructing Bayesian probability models
of many judgement and decision problems.
Our approach to this modelling task involves direct interactions with experts who have
experience in assessing safety critical software on behalf of safety authorities. Our primary
aim has been to explore BBN formalisations of the subjective expertise of an independent
safety assessor. This has involved eliciting some objective representation of certain aspects
of the subjective understanding of this generic class of problems. The safety assessor’s
subjective understanding stems from theoretical knowledge, accumulated experience in a
range of particular, similar safety assessment tasks, and more general experience of related
situations. As with any other BBN modelling exercise, the more objective representation
which we are attempting to construct consists of:-
• a set of carefully defined variables (inevitably including some of a rather abstract and
subjective nature);
• a statement using a graphical language of a number of formal, probabilistic conditional
independence relations (the dependency model) which are assumed to apply for these
variables; and, lastly,
• a set of numerical conditional probability distributions1 which is minimally sufficient,
given the dependency model, to determine a complete joint probability distribution over
the full set of defined variables.
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 We will term the tabulation of such a conditional distribution function a CPT (conditional probability
table) throughout this document. In all BBN models there is one such table required for each variable
of the model, i.e. for each node. It may be that ‘NPT (node probability table)’ is a more appropriate
term, since the distributions attached to certain nodes of the net (the root nodes) will be
unconditional (see Section 4 and the general literature on BBNs for further explanation) but,
Having completed all three of these stages, the unique joint probability distribution that
results can be regarded as a complete description of all uncertainty concerning all of the
variables of the model and their stochastic interactions.
We do not intend here to describe the theory of BBN models itself—there is an extensive
existing literature on this (see e.g. [Pearl 1993, Pearl 1988, CACM 1995, Jensen 1996,
Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter 1988]). We intend to present the conclusions obtained to date of
an ongoing empirical investigation into the benefits and effects of applying a BBN modelling
approach to the safety assessment of a class of nuclear computer-based systems. In Section 2
we describe this application domain in some detail, and outline what we expect will be the
scope of application of our particular model. In Sections 3 and 4 we describe the BBN
model, as it has evolved up till now. The process of constructing, criticising, and validating a
BBN model can consume a considerable amount of effort, partly because of the flexibility of
such models using current tools, and the high ‘visibility’ of the modelling assumptions.
These models are well suited to a kind of incremental development - involving
experimentation with changes to both the topology and the conditional probability tables -
which is easily achieved using modern BBN tools such as Hugin. In this sense, we regard the
model on which we are reporting here as having the status of ‘work in progress’. Section 3
concentrates on the variable definitions (nodes) and conditional independence assumptions
used (network topology). Section 4 discusses the elicitation of precise numerical conditional
probability distributions for the values of the model variables, and gives examples of the
numerical posterior distributions output by the BBN method. In Section 5 we provide some
information about the process whereby we came to arrive at the current model, we discuss
some general advantages and outstanding problems with the BBN approach, and mention the
possible directions in which this work might be taken further. Section 6 contains a summary
of our main conclusions and discusses our immediate intentions for pursuing this modelling
approach within DeVa.
2 Licensing of Nuclear Computer-Based Systems
The BBN we present in this paper applies to a class of software based systems used in
nuclear plant for functions important to safety. For obvious reasons of professional
discretion, the identity of the licensees, manufacturers, systems and functions from which the
expertise captured by the BBN is in part drawn has been kept confidential and not even
revealed to co-authors. It is only the precise delineation of the class of nuclear safety
functions to which the BBN is intended to apply which is necessary to preserve the
usefulness of the results. These safety functions are all of the highest criticality and under the
responsibility of systems called ‘safety systems’ by international nuclear safety guides.
These functions include those of the reactor protection system, whose role is to detect the
fact that the state of a nuclear reactor has moved outside its allowed safe limits, to trip the
reactor in that eventuality, and to assist the operators to keep it safe after the trip. In this
                                                                                                                                                 
throughout this document, we have standardised on the term CPT, made applicable to all nodes,
including root nodes.
context, safety means low probability of dangerous releases of radiation, either internally
within the plant or externally to the wider environment and the public.
The class includes also other functions such as the protection of safety engineering features’
power supplies, the monitoring of critical plant and core parameters in post-accidental
situations, the display of alarms and their masking in certain phases of operations, etc.
The inputs to these systems include sensor values of physical parameters such as reactor core
temperature, coolant pressures and levels, and possibly various inputs from instrumentation
and micro-processors embedded in the reactor hardware. The output data include commands
given to devices such as actuators, valves, pumps, information for control room displays and
alarm systems.
In preparation for the construction of our formal BBN model, we discussed informally the
typical development life-cycle for a system of the kind we are concerned with here, and the
activity of the safety authority in observing and reacting to this development through the role
of the independent safety assessor.
2.1 Safety System Development Phases
A software-based nuclear safety system, or component system, is typically developed using a
sequence of development phases. The licensee and the manufacturer produces a particular
piece of safety-critical software in the form of a sequence of intermediate products produced
by successive phases. These are termed in this paper:-
System Requirements Document
↓
Computer System Specification Document
↓
Software Specification Document
↓
Code Document
↓
Internal Test Document
It is the task of the independent safety assessors to examine all of these intermediate
products, and to gain what evidence they can obtain about the quality of all the development
processes used to produce them.
In this paper, as an initial step towards analysing the larger safety assessment problem, we
concentrate our attention on modelling those parts of the activities of the safety authority’s
independent assessors which address evidence arising from the initial phase of system
development, up to the production of the Computer System Specification document. Thus
the partial net as formulated here models the completion of only the first stage (first arrow
above) of the typical sequence of development steps. As far as this net is concerned, the goal
variable is ‘Adequacy of Computer System Specification’. We regard the BBN produced in
this paper as representing only a part of a considerably larger modelling exercise which
covers the entire development life-cycle, and which we have not attempted to formulate here.
As far as it is possible to generalise about the typical process by which nuclear
instrumentation systems are developed, a typical scenario for the first stages of the
development of such a system, on which we shall now concentrate our attention, seems to be
as described in the next three paragraphs.
The development of a system important to nuclear safety normally begins with the elicitation
and specification of a System Requirements Document, accompanied by an assessment of the
system’s foreseeable failure modes, an enumeration of intended lines of defence against each
of these modes, and an analysis in terms of anticipated frequencies of classes of different
postulated initiating events related to these failure modes. Thus the two processes of hazard
analysis and system requirements specification take place in an integrated way at the
beginning phase of the development process. The requirements document consists essentially
of a statement of requirements written with classical engineering terminology and in natural
language. This document would describe the tasks the system is required to perform,
together with a detailed description of the environment in which it is required to operate,
including the constraints and the values that must be maintained by various physical
environmental parameters.
As part of this phase of requirements formulation and failure modes analysis, the level of
criticality of the system is assessed. This may be done, for instance, in terms of postulated
initiating events (PIE) corresponding to well defined types of faults (e.g. a pipe break).
These events are classified according to their anticipated frequencies of occurrence, these
frequencies being estimated from past operational experience data from similar plant
designs. To each class are associated upper limits on the radiological consequences of any
single PIE. The basic principle is that the most frequent events must yield little or no
radiological risk.
For every postulated initiating fault, including other potential failures which may directly
result from the PIE, and possibly under other conservative assumptions, it is required to
demonstrate that following this fault sequence no unacceptable radiological risk can occur.
These analyses are done for every PIE. They may imply probabilistic arguments. As a result
of these analyses for instance upper limits may be required on the rate of failure per demand
of the equipment and systems in charge of controlling and mitigating the consequences of the
postulated initiating events. The independent assessor may affect the system specifications at
this stage by formulating objections if the plant safety requirements or the safety design
criteria are not judged complete, correct or precise enough. The subsequent decision as to
acceptance or rejection of the system and safety requirements will be influenced by the
licensee’s and developer’s responses to these specific objections by the safety assessor.
The second documentation entity chronologically following the Requirements Specification
is termed in our discussion the ‘Computer System Specification Document’. Ideally this
should take the form of a clear, understandable document, specifying in particular, and
justifying, decisions taken relating to the allocation of safety functions to hardware and
software respectively. It must be demonstrated that the system architecture satisfies the
system and safety requirements, in particular that adequate levels of redundancy and
diversity have been introduced. Walls and barriers between safety and non-safety functions
must also be clearly specified. A failure modes and effects analysis should be presented in
terms of the software and hardware structural decomposition into system components, and
the methods and mechanisms of auto-detection by the system of its own failure should be
specified.
The Computer System Specification Document would normally make greater use than the
Requirements Document of diagrammatic forms of representation such as data flow
diagrams and flow charts. The independent safety assessor affects the development at this
level by formulating objections to the Computer System Specification. (e.g. “It is
unacceptable to us that the system fails to tolerate faults of the kind ....”) The subsequent
decision as to acceptance or rejection of the system will be influenced by the licensee’s and
developer’s responses to these specific objections of the independent safety assessor.
The BBN model in this paper - see Figure 1 - represents evidence regarding the direct safety
assessment of the two preceding artefacts of our life-cycle model : the System Requirements
document, and the Computer System Specification document. In future extensions of the
work, we envisage that there will be an arrow out of the Adequacy of Computer System
Specification node - which is our goal node here - to other variables further along the system
life-cycle. Such extensions will lead to a BBN-based model of the entire assessment task of
the independent assessor. It is our intention to continue further towards this objective within
the DeVa project.
2.2 The Role of the Independent Assessor
There are three key institutional roles involved in the interactions modelled by this net: the
independent assessor (who works on behalf of a safety authority ); the system manufacturer;
and the system licensee. Our particular net is a representation of the assessment activities of
the independent safety assessor. This role is usually occupied by a department of the nuclear
authority with responsibility for assessing the safety of the instrumentation, control, and
protection systems of nuclear power plants, and should normally employ personnel with
expertise in nuclear instrumentation and computer systems and expertise in nuclear plant
safety engineering.
The independent assessor’s responsibility is to assess the safety of the system and ultimately
to recommend approval (or not to) for its use in the plant by the licensee. The licensee
remains responsible for the safety of the plant, and has the duty of demonstrating this safety
to the independent assessor. The independent assessor is usually not prescriptive, i.e. does
not impose specific methods and techniques of design, implementation, verification or
validation to the licensee and the manufacturer. However, he or she will request evidence
that the safety and system requirements are adequate, and that they are satisfied by the
system design, its implementation, and its use in operations.
Therefore, over the entire development process of the system there are many diverse factors
influencing the likely safety of the system, which will be taken into account by the
independent safety assessor. Among others, they may be related to:-
• the ability to demonstrate the validity of the system requirements, to validate their
implementation, and in particular to demonstrate an adequate coverage of the
verifications and the validation tests;
• productivity pressures and the effects of these and of other factors on both complexity
and general quality of design and code, and specifically on their likely fault content;
• the competence of staff used for all the design and verification intermediate tasks from
the requirements specification to the final integrated system.
However, as we have stated above, for the purposes of this paper we will concentrate on
modelling the influence of evidence concerning one of the earlier development phases on the
judgement processes of the independent safety assessor. We envisage that, at a later stage,
this work will ultimately be expanded to cover assessment of evidence relating to all the later
development phases, up to the completion of the operational system (or system component)
whose safety is to be assessed. However, the completion of such a model, in which we could
have real confidence, would be a very large task indeed. Within the DeVa project, we aim
only to make some further well-documented progress towards such a goal.
We should point out an issue about the time at which a judgement is made and the effects of
this on determining the kind of evidence that is likely to be available on which to base the
judgement. Depending on circumstances, an independent assessor may become involved in
the development of a protection system or component at an earlier or a later stage. For
example, in judging whether to grant a license for operation of a component sub-system, the
information available to the regulator differs depending on whether the licensee has chosen
to select from pre-existing software systems available on the market, or has instead decided
to design a new software system. In the latter case, more information about the sub-system
will normally be available to the safety authority, because the independent assessor will
expect to be in a position to follow and observe the design process directly as it progresses,
rather than having to rely on recorded past documentation about it. A BBN model is well
suited to being repeatedly applied as more evidence accumulates, because there is no built-in
formal distinction between observable and unobservable variables. Different subsets of the
model’s variables may be observable at different times, allowing predictions or estimations
to be made at any particular time concerning any of the remaining variables. So we would
expect a BBN model such as ours to be applicable to several different situations, with
availability of different items of evidence for the particular system or sub-system to which it
is applied. Equally it might be applied repeatedly to different stages of an evolving situation,
as more sources of observable evidence become available.
In assessing the System Requirements Document, the assessor’s job may be to assess an
already completed Requirements Document. But the safety authority might, in the case of
some systems, be involved at an earlier stage - able to observe the process of preparing
successive versions of this document, and hence able to take account of additional kinds of
evidence. The BBN includes this second approach. In this case, the assessor judges the
quality of the system requirements through the quality of the elicitation and validation
process, and through the quality of the contents of produced documents, in consultation with
the domain experts (nuclear engineers) who are employed by the safety authority. The
System Requirements document normally consists primarily of an understandable natural
language specification of the system, augmented by some semiformal diagrammatic
representations familiar to nuclear instrumentation and control engineers. This document will
be examined by the independent assessor specifically with a view that it should be
understandable, without ambiguities and that the control functions and safety functions are
completely and correctly specified. The safety assessor attaches great importance to the
assessment of the quality of the failure modes assessment exercise done at this stage. The
assessor needs to verify that the criticality allocation of the system is correct, and then to
assess whether the system specifications achieve the safety requirements stipulated for
systems of this criticality category. For this kind of safety-critical application the logic and
mathematical safety-related functions should consist of rather simple, easily understandable
operations like: compare a value to a threshold; take a maximum or a minimum of a finite
number of values; evaluate an integral, or a derivative.
For the assessment of both the Computer System Specification and sometimes the
Requirements documents, it is sometimes possible to directly assess the competence of the
staff who created the document (i.e. through direct means apart from inferring backwards
from examination of the document itself). This direct staff-competence factor is not always
taken into account by the assessor. Where it is done, this would tend to be in terms of the
staff’s (or their employer’s) reputation for previous, similar work and an assessment of
whether this previous work is generally held to be of a high quality. In the BBN as presented
here we have allowed for this possibility with the Computer System Specification document,
but not for the Requirements document. This was somewhat of an arbitrary decision: We
could easily have done otherwise.
3 Node Definitions and Structure of the Network Topology.
The network topology we elicited is shown in Figure 1. We see that its general structure
strongly reflects the life-cycle model used. The ‘backbone’ of the graph consists of three
nodes: ‘Quality of Requirements’, ‘Design Process Performance’, and, the goal node of this
BBN, ‘Adequacy of Computer System Specification’. These three can be thought of as the
foci of three sub-graphs, or ‘clusters’, of nodes arranged in a linear, approximately
chronological and causal sequence. These three sub-graphs are indicated by the dotted lines
(which are provided to aid the reader’s appreciation of the graph structure, and have no
meaning in terms of the BBN syntax): at the bottom we have a cluster of nodes providing
evidence relating to the requirements specification. These nodes all branch off from the
central node, for this bottom cluster, which represents the unknown ‘truth’ regarding a
general Quality of Requirements attribute of the requirements specification documents. At
the top of the net is a cluster of nodes representing the quality of the resulting Computer
System Specification document, with nodes for the various key sources of evidence relating
directly to this. Mediating between these two is a central ‘process’ cluster representing
evidence bearing on the quality of the development process connecting these two artefacts.
The semantics of the BBN arrow notation is discussed in detail elsewhere. See e.g.
[Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter 1988, Pearl 1988, Jensen 1996]. We mention only that, in terms
of the formal probabilistic dependency model, the meaning of the arrows can be exactly
stated. At the same time, there is some dissension in the BBN community about how best to
employ this formal semantics in order to formulate the topology of a BBN model in practice.
Arguably, the presence of an arrow can, more or less often, be interpreted as indicating a
supposed causal relation between two nodes [Pearl 1988, p126], [Pearl 1994]. Ultimately
though, we prefer, in the BBN of Figure 1, to refer directly to the probabilistic dependency
model interpretation expressed in terms of a system of conditional independence relations
regarded as inherent in the subjective probabilistic beliefs of the independent assessor.
We will define the node variables below in three sections, according to these three
component clusters of our BBN topology. In each case, the proposed state space of the node
is shown in brackets following its name. In the majority of cases, the values in the state-
space of a node represent categories defined by the independent assessor so as to correspond
to aspects of his or her subjective safety assessment activity. In most cases this scale is an
ordinal scale [Fenton 1991], though we do not propose this as an absolute requirement of
interpretation. For example, in the case of the 5 point scale for the ‘Adequacy of Computer
System Specification’ node, there are two underlying dimensions of assessment involved in
the specification of this state-space: the presence or absence of actual safety problems with
the document; and the ease with which the assessor is able to judge this from direct
examination of the document.
3.1 ‘Requirements Document’ sub-graph
Quality of Requirements (‘Poor’ ‘OK’ ‘Good’) The requirements document consists
essentially of a statement of requirements written in natural language. This document would
describe the task the system is required to perform, together with details of the environment
in which it is required to do this, such as the values of various physical environmental
parameters, etc. Attributes such as completeness, correctness, consistency, understandability,
verifiability are normally thought of as comprising the quality of such a document.
Perhaps a metaphor for how we have treated this node in our topology - with a number of
more specific quality aspects represented as child nodes - would be the attribute of ‘general
intelligence’ of a person. The role of the central node here is essentially one of conceptual
simplification and presentation of what is actually just a model assumption about the
stochastic association between more concrete attributes of the requirements document2. It
represents a single amalgamation of a number of associated, but distinct, quality attributes.
Compare asking human subjects to perform tasks of various different kinds for the purposes
of assessing specialised kinds of mental ability. In understanding a relationship between
these abilities, and associated performance levels, which we believe we should expect to
observe (and/or feel that we have actually observed), we can choose to introduce a notion of
a  general  mental  ability  to  which  all  these  other  abilities  are assumed  to  be positively
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 That is, the position of the Requirements Quality node within the topology provides a mathematical
model of the form of the association between its child nodes.
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associated. Similarly in our BBN topology, the general property of ‘requirements quality’
sits in the middle of (is composed of) four more specific attributes of requirements. For each
of these four, we have a related observable node, providing a more or less accurate
measurement instrument (the specific accuracy being represented by a CPT). But the link of
this cluster to ‘the rest of the net’ is simplified by requiring that all connections are via the
central, generic ‘requirements quality’ node. Equally, it sometimes simplifies various
human/social/management tasks to think along the lines “this person is quite intelligent”, etc.
Bearing in mind that BBNs can be developed and tested in an evolutionary fashion, this
structure seemed to our independent assessor to be a reasonably accurate starting position for
his or her beliefs about what can be inferred from specific requirements quality evidence.
Anticipation of Plant & System Failure Modes & Hazards (‘Sketchy’, ‘Satisfactory’,
‘Detailed’) This, typically unobservable, node represents “the truth” about one of the four
facets of general ‘requirements quality’ (its parent). As part of the safety demonstration, the
system requirements should be subject to a failure analysis. Potential failures of the system
should be identified, their impact on the application should be evaluated, and the presence of
adequate defences should be confirmed. In particular, potential failures at the interface with
the plant, such as sensor defects, inputs out of range, etc., should be identified and adequate
system reactions should be defined.
Independent Hazard Analysis Report (‘Superficial’ ‘Average’ ‘Thorough’) The
independent assessor may discover, by inspection, defects or inadequacies, of greater or
lesser seriousness, in the previous hazard analysis which will have been provided, usually by
the licensee. The idea is that this node will typically be the observable consequence of its
non-observable parent. The number and nature of inadequacies in this report are indications
of the thoroughness of the independent hazard analysis. From the pertinence of these
inadequacies, values for the parent node may be inferred.
Adequacy with respect to Application Safety Requirements (‘Unsatisfactory’
‘Satisfactory’) Usually unobservable. The system must be demonstrated to comply with the
safety requirements of the application. For instance, one may identify a set of initiating
events to which the system is supposed to react with protective actions so as to keep the
frequencies and the consequences of these events within predetermined limits.
Plant Experts’ Safety Assessment Report (‘Superficial’ ‘Average’ ‘Thorough’)
Observable consequences of its non-observable parent. See description of ‘Independent
Assessor Hazard Analysis Report’.
Completeness & Correctness (‘No’ ‘Yes’) Obvious meaning, but usually not a directly
observable node.
Licensee Verification Thoroughness (‘Superficial’ ‘Average’ ‘Thorough’) Here ‘licensee’
means the licensee’s system architect. Thoroughness may be observed and characterised by
the nature and number of the comments and defects noted in the verification report. From the
criticality of these observations, values of the parent node can be inferred.
Understandability by Manufacturer - Absence of Ambiguity (‘Inadequate’
‘Satisfactory’ ‘Good’) This, typically unobservable, node represents “the truth” about one of
the four facets of general ‘requirements quality’ (its parent). It is essential for the quality of
the implementation that the manufacturer’s designers have a thorough understanding of and
familiarity with the system requirements and their implications.
Manufacturer Verification Report (‘Superficial’ ‘Average’ ‘Thorough’) Could include
the reports on results from the execution of prototypes. Quality of test plan, test coverage, &
test reports.
3.2 ‘Design Process’ sub-graph
Design Process Performance (‘Unsatisfactory’ ‘OK’ ‘Good’) This refers only to that part
of the total design activity that takes place chronologically up till the life-cycle stage of
designing a ‘Computer System Specification’ has been completed, working from the
Requirements Document.
Actual Advantage Achieved by Design Guidelines (‘No’ ‘Yes’) Advantages resulting from
complying with the recommendations pertaining to specifications, design, verification,
validation, such as those within specific standards such as the IEC 880.
Prescriptiveness & Inherent Value of Design Guidelines (‘Low’ ‘Good’) Pragmatic
guidelines, not limited to general principles and motherhood recommendations, can have a
concrete impact on the quality of the design, for instance its verifiability.
Adherence to Design Guidelines (‘No’ ‘Yes’) Non adherence may be observed when
guidelines are simply ignored. Designers may claim adherence, but this may be formal only.
This possibility is taken into account in the CPT of ‘Actual Advantage Achieved by Design
Guidelines’
Problem Complexity (manufacturer) (‘Complex/Difficult’ ‘Moderate’ ‘Simple/Easy’)
The manufacturer may replace the licensee’s problem by a different problem, of a greater or
lesser complexity, or may transform the original problem into a different problem - e.g. for
reasons to do with their longer-term commercial intentions for marketing solutions to
applications related to this one.
Nuclear Safety Application Specific? (‘No’ ‘Yes’) . System modules used may, or may not,
have originally been intended for use with safety-critical systems, or may not be intended to
be used in future only in this application. This requirement for portability to applications of
other kinds can create added system complexity. For example additional system
configuration variables might have to be introduced into the design for this purpose.
Problem Complexity (licensee) (‘Complex/Difficult’ ‘Moderate’ ‘Simple/Easy’) This node
refers to the complexity or difficulty of the original problem owned by the system licensee
which motivates the licensee to commission the system. Note that the small cluster of three
nodes (on the left hand side) to which it belongs are currently the only nodes having separate
direct paths to both the ‘Quality of Requirements’ and the ‘Design Process Performance’
nodes.
Past Competence of Designers (‘Low’ ‘Average’ ‘Good’) Competence of the designers in
the realisation of similar systems (usually non observable). It is inferred from its two
children nodes, which represent the objective record (‘Previous experience’) and the other
evidence of competence (‘Reputation’) which may indicate that the visible record may be
misleading.
Previous Experience of Designers (‘0 Similar Systems Licensed’ ‘1 Similar System
Licensed’ ‘>1 Similar Systems Licensed’) The state variable here is the number of success
stories with ‘similar systems’—success stories meaning that the system was licensed and has
not since manifested safety defects in operation.
Reputation of Designers (‘Doubtful’ ‘Average’ ‘Good’) This variable represents a general
subjective assessment of competence. Observable effect of its non-observable parent.
Resource Impact (‘Inadequate’ ‘Adequate’) Extent to which plentifulness of resources may
have aided high ‘Design Process Performance’. It is not observable, but its two parents are.
The assessor has the manufacturer’s report of the resources dedicated to the design process,
but must consider that this report may overestimate the resources actually used, especially in
case of problems within the manufacturer’s organisation (cf. ‘Commercial Pressure’).
Commercial Pressure (‘High’ ‘Low’) Pressures (e.g. development deadlines) within the
manufacturer’s organisation, which may have created scarcity of resources. The scale is
subjective, representing the assessor’s own judgement of the evidence available to him or her
(i.e., this is intended as an observable node—see comment in Section 3.4).
Reported Resources (‘Inadequate’ ‘Adequate’ ‘More than Adequate’) This node
represents the adequacy of the resources that the manufacturer claims to have dedicated to
the design process. The scale is subjective: the assessor uses the manufacturer’s reports and
compares it with the assessor’s own estimate of the amount of resources that would be
adequate for the task, but ignores any evidence that the reports are inaccurate.
3.3 ‘Computer System Specification’ sub-graph
Adequacy of Computer System Specification (‘Awful’ ‘Unsatisfactory’ ‘OK’ ‘Good’
‘Wonderful’) Since we are focusing on safety assessment, this node refers to ‘adequacy’
from a safety point of view. I.e. its value is not intended to reflect non-safety-related quality
attributes such as the likely impact of this specification on the efficiency of designing the
system, in terms of design effort required, or cost of the hardware components and software
tools needed. Neither should the value of this node be affected by ‘performance’, nor any
other such system attribute whose level is likely to result from this specification, except to
the extent that the attribute in question has some impact on safety. The node states have the
following meanings:
• Awful = It is quite clear from the presentation that there are real problems with the
specification
• Unsatisfactory = It appears that there may be real problems here but they are not easy to
identify or diagnose with confidence.
• OK = We are fairly sure there are no safety problems but this was not obvious, nor can
we now state it with the very highest levels of certainty, because of inadequacies in the
presentation.
• Good = There are no safety problems; and the high quality presentation makes this
apparent
• Wonderful = The presentation is very clear and it is quite obvious that there are no
safety problems with this specification document.
In these state definitions ‘problems’ means outstanding problems, and does not include
problems which were raised, but were later explained away satisfactorily by the
manufacturer.
Note that it is not correct to think of the state space described here as a one-dimensional five-
point ordinal scale. We see it rather as a ‘collapsed’ version of two distinct dimensions.
There is a dimension concerning the true presence or absence of safety-related problems with
this specification document. There is a second dimension relating to the clarity of the
presentation of the specification - its traceability - the extent to which it exemplifies
successful ‘design for validation’; rather than only design for correct (system safety-related)
functionality. Although aspects of the node such as clarity of the presentation may - in a
general sense - be directly assessable by the independent assessor, this node itself is not
observable in our restricted sense of the footnote in Section 3.4. One of its two dimensions -
namely the genuine presence or absence of remaining safety issues - cannot be directly
observed in this sense. Neither is it entirely possible for the independent assessor to observe
the degree to which the specification is understandable and amenable to detailed analysis by
independent verifiers at the manufacturer and licensee sites. These latter qualities are
important in view of the fact that the computer system specifications will be the basis of the
documentation given to the programmers.
Manufacturer Verification Coverage & Quality (‘Unsatisfactory’ ‘OK’ ‘Good’)
Unobservable node representing the truth about how well the manufacturer verified the
system. The evidence from the manufacturer role in the verification of the system will
generally - at this phase of system development - tend to carry less weight than the licensee-
verification contribution.
Manufacturer Verification Apparent Coverage & Quality (‘Unsatisfactory’ ‘OK’
‘Good’) The purpose of this node is to represent the independent assessor’s knowledge that
he/she only sees reports of manufacturer verification activity - i.e., does not observe that
activity itself. Further, it is generally a foregone conclusion that the findings of the reports
presented by the manufacturer to the independent assessor will look reasonably good. So we
think of this observable node merely as evidence as to the possible state of its parent, whose
value it is one of the tasks of the assessor to infer.
Licensee Verification Results (‘0 issues’ ‘A few issues’ ‘Many issues’) This is designed to
be an observable node representing the results and the observable records and indications as
to the thoroughness and quality of the licensee system architect’s verification of the
computer system specification. (Here ‘licensee’ means licensee system architect.) At this
particular development phase, this ‘licensee side’ of the top part of the net is of greater
significance than the manufacturer-verification part.
For state variable here, we use an indication of the number of ‘issues’ raised. The licensee
will raise with the manufacturer issues of concern about the computer system specification.
Often some of these will be satisfactorily resolved by the manufacturer providing some
satisfactory explanation, or will be judged by the independent assessor to be groundless or
inconsequential, for one reason or another. Having eliminated any such ‘false issues’, the
remaining issues, judged by the independent assessor to be ‘valid issues raised’ are the ones
which are counted here.
Licensee Verification Quality (‘Low’ ‘OK’ ‘High’) This variable implicitly depends on an
array of variables which have not been differentiated explicitly, such as the competence of
the licensee verification team, the resources they have available, the time-pressure they are
placed under, etc. It is not necessarily observable.
Independent Hazard Analysis (‘No unresolved issues’ ‘Minor unresolved issues’ ‘Serious
unresolved issues’) The independent hazard analysis refers to an activity of the regulatory
authority itself. In contrast to the other two (manufacturer and licensee) verification branches
of the top part of the net, there is no corresponding second node here for the ‘quality’ of this
(independent assessor’s) analysis. To introduce a performance-quality self-assessment to be
carried out by the independent assessor’s team was thought to be unnecessarily convoluted.
3.4 Further Comments on this Topology
The network, as presently formulated in Figure 1, is topologically only slightly different
from what Pearl calls a ‘causal polytree’ structure [Pearl 1988]. (It contains a single cycle3
which if broken by the removal of a single arrow would leave a causal polytree.) In Figure 1
we have indicated those nodes which would be observable4 in a typical application of this
BBN by appending an asterisk to the node name. We see that in the expected application of
this network, the assumption regarding observability is almost simply that all the leaf nodes
(the nodes having one arrow attached to them) will normally be observable to the
independent assessor: and that the other nodes will normally be unobservable to the
independent assessor. (The two exceptions are: (i) that ‘Licensee Verification Results’ is
                                               
3
 -undirected: directed cycles are forbidden in BBN models [Pearl 1988].
4
 Important note on our use of the term “observable”: By “observable” for a node in this model we
mean merely that we expect to input, into the BBN model when we apply it to the assessment of
some system, a precise value (or perhaps in some circumstances a “likelihood observation”, see
[Jensen 1996]) for that node. So for our purposes here, “observation” includes subjective assessment
of a node’s value (or even in some cases subjective assessment as the definition of the node’s
meaning) using expert judgement. If it is intended that the expert should make such a judgement of
the value of a particular node when assessing a particular system, then, for purposes of brevity in this
paper and of consistency with terminology used in the formal theory of BBNs, we classify this act as
an “observation” and term the node “observable”.
observable whilst ‘Licensee Verification Quality’ may well not be observed; and (ii) that
‘Problem Complexity (licensee)’ will normally be observable.)
We draw attention to these two features of the current topology not because we regard them
as particularly desirable or undesirable, but merely as a way of assisting the reader to digest
the model topology more easily. They are features peculiar to this BBN model. The same
features will not necessarily apply (nor necessarily fail to apply) to other BBN models (for
this or for different application contexts). Likewise it is possible that future criticism of the
structure of this net - whether in the light of output it produces, or simply by inspection -
may result in changes to the topology which will change the character of the net. It is our
understanding that such BBN modelling exercises as this should be expected to result in
models which evolve through a (perhaps long-term) process of criticism and review. To
facilitate such processes of human communication is an important function of the graphical
language and presentation.
4 Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) and Numerical Model Output
From a mathematical point of view, after the definition of node state-spaces and the
construction of the dependency model (expressed by the graph topology), there is an
important final stage required if we are to complete the construction of a full joint
probability distribution over the product state space of the model variables. This stage
consists of the specification of a conditional probability table (CPT) for each node: a table of
conditional probabilities of each of that node’s values, given each combination of values of
its parent nodes. Further theoretical explanation of how these CPTs together define a joint
probability distribution is given in [Pearl 1988], [Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter 1988] and
[Jensen 1996].
In practice, we found with our BBN that for small, relatively low dimensioned CPTs, it is
practical to ask the ‘expert’ (in our case the independent safety assessor) to simply fill in the
numbers of the table by reference to his/her domain knowledge and experience. This was the
technique used for most of the nodes in our net. For a few nodes we used linear interpolation
(see 2nd and 5th bullet points of Section 5.1) as a first approach to filling in some values. For
example, the CPT for the 2-parent ‘Licensee Verification Results’ node was constructed as
follows, where the names of the top two rows of each of the three parts of the table are the
(truncated) names of the two parent nodes. For each ‘Licensee Verification Quality’ value,
distributions were elicited directly in the form of numbers at the central (ok) and extreme
(awful, and wonderful) values of ‘Adequacy of Computer System Specification’. Then ‘first-
cut’ distributions for the two intermediate states (unsatisfactory, and good) of ‘Adequacy of
Computer System Specification’ were obtained by specifying a single numerical linear
interpolation point, resulting in the CPT of Figure 2.
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Figure 2 Elicited CPT for ‘Licensee Verification Results’ node (printed from Hugin tool)
On a point of terminology, when we speak about CPTs in this paper we have a standard
layout in mind (which would be obtained from Figure 2 by aligning the three sections of the
table horizontally, instead of vertically as they are show) in which the CPT has one row for
each possible state of the node in question, and one column for each possible combination of
values of the states of that node’s parents. Each column should therefore consist of numbers
whose total is 1.
For the few larger CPTs, most notably the CPT of the ‘Design Process Performance’ node, it
becomes unrealistic to set the assessor this task. Some more systematic method seems called
for to address the sheer scale of the problem. For example, even with the rather coarse
grading into variable values that we have used in the current version of the net, the ‘Design
Process Performance’ CPT is required to be a six dimensional table of dimensions
3×3×3×2×2×3, i.e. requiring 324 numerical entries. Admittedly, since these must represent
probability distributions, there are only 216 independent entries in this table. But still this is a
large number. There are a number of possible responses to this problem. Firstly, we might
ask: Do we really need a node having this number of parents (i.e. five)? Is it possible to
argue for a modified dependency model which would win some advantage here, by some
strategy such as to introduce an extra node in a position which reduces the numbers of
parents of individual nodes? This may be a matter for profitable future discussion. For the
present, however, our independent assessor preferred to persist with the current topology of
Figure 1. Having made this decision, there are strategies, besides attempting to change the
topology, for approaching the resulting combinatorial problem of the scale of certain of the
CPTs. The elicitation of multivariate joint and conditional probability distributions is a
significant research area in its own right [Keeney and von Winterfeldt 1991, Chhibber et al.
1992, Vanlenthe 1993, Chaloner et al. 1992], which obviously has great potential application
in BBN construction. Apart from existing systematic methods and tools, it is likely that there
may be others not yet devised which would help here. Some of the methods which we tried
during our CPT elicitation to deal with multiple parent nodes are discussed in Section 5.
We have yet to complete the CPT for the Design Process Performance node in a way that is
satisfactory to the independent assessor. - Although progress does seem to be achievable with
this task using the methods outlined in the list of Section 5.1.
However, sufficient progress has been made with CPT elicitation to enable us to show here a
few examples indicating the kind of numerical output that can be produced from such a
model. We will concentrate on examining the effect of various combinations of assumptions
and observations about the values of other nodes of the BBN on beliefs about the main goal
node ‘Adequacy of Computer System Specification’. Let us agree on a notation (p
a
, p
u
, p
o
, pg,
p
w
) to represent current probabilistic beliefs about the value of this node, where the subscripts
identify the five states, from most unfavourable (‘awful’) on the left, and where the ps are
expressed in percentage terms. We begin by making the artificial assumption that all parent
nodes of the ‘Design Process Performance’ node other than ‘Quality of Requirements’ are
assigned hypothetical fixed, known states. This assumption relieves us from the necessity of
completing the CPT of ‘Design Process Performance’ entirely (although some columns of
this CPT will still be required in order to proceed: we did elicit these.). Throughout the
results that follow, the two parent nodes which were ranked by our assessor as the least
significant of the five parents will be assumed fixed in states ‘Actual Advantage Achieved by
Design Guidelines’ = ‘Yes’ and ‘Resource Impact’ = ‘Adequate’.
We begin by assigning the values ‘Past Competence of Designers’ = ‘Average’ and ‘Problem
Complexity (manufacturer)’ = ‘Moderate’. This yields the distribution (7.09, 28.63, 50.83,
12.46, 1.00) for our goal node. Adding the observation ‘Manufacturer Verification Apparent
Coverage & Quality’ = ‘Unsatisfactory’ lowers, as one might expect, the confidence in the
Computer System Specification, giving a distribution (4.41, 57.06, 33.77, 4.14, 0.33). A
favourable observation on the same node, ‘Manufacturer Verification Apparent Coverage &
Quality’ = ‘Good’ gives instead the distribution (7.30, 17.89, 57.53, 15.99, 1.28) for the goal
node.
We can also enter evidence at the nodes corresponding to the requirements quality sub-net of
the BBN. Keeping the assumptions of the last paragraph, but now retracting any
‘Manufacturer Verification Apparent Coverage & Quality’ observation, and instead making
the observations ‘Manufacturer Verification Report’ = ‘Average’, ‘Plant Experts’ Safety
Assessment Report’ = ‘Thorough’, and ‘Licensee Verification Thoroughness’ = ‘Average’
results in the distribution (5.30, 25.95, 54.4, 13.35, 1.00) which seems to be a slight
improvement on the initial beliefs. If we now combine this evidence with the observation
‘Manufacturer Verification Apparent Coverage & Quality’ = ‘Unsatisfactory’ that we used
before from the top part of the net, we obtain (3.66, 53.79, 37.59, 4.61, 0.35) and it seems
reasonably clear that this last unfavourable observation has had a larger negative effect on
our beliefs than the small increase in confidence that the requirements quality observations
alone had appeared to bring.
We finish this illustrative set of numerical outputs by adding to this situation (the one
represented by the last figures in the previous paragraph) the effect of more optimistic
assumptions for the middle, ‘Design Process Performance’ part of the net. If we replace our
assumptions about designer past competence and problem complexity by the following: ‘Past
Competence of Designers’ = ‘Good’ and ‘Problem Complexity (manufacturer)’ =
‘Simple/Easy’, our consequent improved confidence in the ‘Adequacy of Computer System
Specification’ node is represented by the distribution (2.69, 36.25, 35.12, 22.87, 3.07). Of
course, the size of this improvement is partly a consequence of the fact that, due to the
current incomplete state of our numerical CPT elicitation exercise for the ‘Design Process
Performance’ node, we have - unrealistically -  made assumptions directly about some of its
adjacent nodes, rather than requiring longer paths of inference from the nodes truly intended
to represent observables for input to the model (such as the nodes: ‘Reputation of Designers’,
‘Previous Experience of Designers’, ‘Problem Complexity (licensee)’, ‘Nuclear Application
Specific’). When we reach a stage of model development allowing us to do the latter, then
we anticipate that the effects of the more realistic ‘process evidence’ this will allow us to
supply will be weaker than the effects of the rather unrealistically strong process assumptions
we have made here.
At this stage, this kind of hypothetical inference is mostly useful for the assessor in exploring
and ‘debugging’ the net. After the BBN has reached its final version, similar inference would
be applied to decision problems.
5 Model Elicitation and Development: Problems Encountered, Some ad
hoc Solutions, Future Work
5.1 General Procedure and some Shortcuts
The elicitation from an expert of all the information needed to define a BBN is, as we have
indicated, a complex task in all except the most trivial cases. We found, for example, that it
was not possible to sensibly carry out this exercise in a single sequence from nodes, through
states and structure, ending with CPTs. Instead, there was extensive iteration: elicitation at a
later stage in this sequence resulted in back-tracking and changing the information that had
been elicited at an earlier stage. We feel that such an iteration is probably inevitable, if only
because the domain expert will often not be an expert on BBNs and will thus be learning this
methodology as the exercise proceeds. In such a case, it would be unwise for the elicitors to
impose a simple progression, even if this were possible. The assessor and the knowledge
elicitor will begin to understand better the full consequences (for later modelling stages) of
modelling decisions they take at an early stage only after having gained some experience of
these consequences.
The difficulties of elicitation varied through the different stages. By far the hardest problems
were posed by the need to elicit the multivariate CPTs required by the net topology. The
node ‘Design Process Performance’, as we have indicated, presented the largest problem and
this could have been a candidate for the kind of iteration mentioned above. When we realised
how difficult the elicitation problem was for this part of the net topology, a possible solution
might have been to go back and alter the topology: essentially introducing extra, intermediate
nodes to reduce the dimension of this distribution. After discussion with our subject, we
chose not to follow this route, and instead sought means of easing the task of eliciting the
required six-dimensional probability table.
Listed below are some ways of proceeding that were suggested to the assessor - based on
grounds of intuitive reasonableness - as ways of easing this elicitation process, with some
success:
• Order, or partially order, the parent nodes (the nodes themselves: not their states, or
state combinations) according to their significance, then fix the values of the least
significant nodes, and begin by numerically constructing the resulting smaller
dimensioned CPT. This CPT could then later be expanded upon by fixing now the states
of the most significant nodes and attempting to generalise about the perturbations
produced from these probabilities by the weaker parent node influences.
• Order, or partially order, the parent node state combinations in accordance with some
believed stochastic ordering of the child node conditional distributions. Then fill in
actual numerical conditional probabilities, given these parent node value combinations,
in a table with its columns first ordered from left to right according to this expected
stochastic ordering of the distributions.
• Amalgamate certain states of the child node and produce first the conditional
distributions for this ‘coarser grained’ child variable.
• For most nodes, the assessor made use of previous knowledge from a set of earlier,
similar safety systems in the following way. These historical observations would first be
used to produce a relative frequency-based CPT estimate for the node in question. Then,
by attempting to understand these initial relative frequency CPT estimates, the
independent assessor sometimes found him/herself prompted to postulate laws or trends,
which may or may not previously have been explicit in his/her general understanding of
the phenomena involved. On consideration in greater depth, such postulated laws were
sometimes used to suggest refined CPT tables, correcting the effects of lack of
representativeness resulting either from the small sample size or from other individual
peculiarities of the limited set of systems with which the independent assessor was
familiar.
• Provide probability distributions at ‘extreme’ cases, for example at the extremes of
ordered sequences of parent node value combinations (2nd bullet in this list), and then
examine intermediate distributions defined at specified linear interpolation points
between these extreme distributions (i.e. discrete mixtures or weighted sums of the
extreme distributions). The assessor can then make fine adjustments from these values,
where it is felt necessary to do so. In some cases, the extreme values between which we
interpolated here had first been obtained by stating a distribution for one particular
parent value combination which the assessor felt to be a ‘middle point’ in terms of the
associated distribution of the child node. This middle distribution was defined as a
reference point, to begin the process, with balancing extreme distributions then
constructed on either side.
Apart from the use of linear interpolation between distributions obtained as mixtures of
extreme distributions, we did not enlist existing theory on parametric distribution families or
their estimation. However, there is ongoing research in this area in other current projects (see
e.g. [Neil and Galliers 1997]) which we believe may have application to nuclear safety
assessment BBNs based on the one described here.
All these methods essentially allow the assessor to assume that the probabilistic dependencies
among the random variables of interest enjoy some form of ‘natural’ regularity, so that the
CPT can be described, within reasonable approximation, by comparatively few parameters
rather than the whole set of its entries. Of course, this is not without risks: if the problem
were simple in the first place, the use of a BBN would not be felt necessary. However, we
believe it to be more cost-effective to obtain a rough description through these shortcuts, and
then eliminate any serious problems in a subsequent revision, than attempting the impossible
task of enumerating all values in one heroic session.
5.2 Feedback to the Assessor
We also made use of various forms of visual feedback to the assessor of the probability
distributions as they were elicited. There are innumerable ways that this can be done, each
useful for different purposes, and in slightly different situations, and capable of usefully
becoming quite sophisticated (using similar techniques to those used in graphical exploratory
data analysis tools attached to modern statistics packages). As an example of a relatively
simple form of visual feedback, we noticed that, where a child node has only three possible
states, the conditional distribution of that node, for each particular combination of the values
of its parent nodes (i.e. any one column of the node’s CPT) can be plotted as a single point in
an equilateral triangle (rather than using a column of three numerical values, or a histogram,
or pie or bar chart to represent the distribution). This is the triangle
{ }( , , ) ; ,p p p p p p pi1 2 3 1 2 30 1≥ + + = transformed into 2-dimensional co-ordinates. We
mention this representation as one of the many possibilities which might, in principle, be
collected in a support toolbox to provide a rich variety of forms of feedback to the analyst of
the ‘shape’ of the beliefs which he or she has entered in numerical CPT form. In the case of
this particular triangle-plot example, the three numerical probabilities associated with a
point, are proportional to its perpendicular distance from each of the three sides of the
triangle. The fact that we have then reduced the representation of a scalar distribution to just
a single point’s position, allows the effect of changing parent node values to be presented
visually without the diagram becoming too crowded for comprehension. We can represent
changes in one parent node, by joining a series of these points in the triangle by straight line
segments; and the effect of a changes in a second parent node, in combination with the first,
can be indicated by a plot consisting of one of these lines for each value of that second node,
ideally using a different colour or line format for each line. The resulting plot for the CPT of
Figure 2 is shown in Figure 3 to illustrate this idea.
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Figure 3 Plot of CPT of ‘Licensee Verification Results’
5.3 General Problems in Elicitation
Whilst multi-dimensionality is a major difficulty, it would be wrong to imply that elicitation
of probabilities for simpler nodes is a trivial exercise. One method of generating the required
distributions that was used by the assessor for several nodes was to derive a first
approximation using conditional frequencies from the values taken by the parent and the
child states in the previous safety cases in which the assessor had been involved. Then, the
assessor would state conditional probability distributions from these frequencies by making
small corrections to remove peculiarities resulting from the small sample size or the specific
problems with the sampled data. One way of performing these corrections is to estimate the
relative likelihood of these peculiar features in practice. This was perceived as a feasible
approach to deriving first-cut probabilities. However, it needs to be followed by thorough re-
analysis as it appears liable to well known systematic biases [Chhibber et al. 1992, Strigini
1994].
A more formal approach when there is empirical data would be to use Dirichlet distributions
for each column of CPT as Bayesian conjugate priors, and this is something that we plan to
investigate: there are already techniques and automated tools for this [Cooper and Herskovits
1992, Heckerman and Geiger et al 1995].
In the absence of abundant empirical data, eliciting the contents of the conditional
probability tables in a BBN presents several practical problems, apart from those of scale
arising with large multidimensional BBNs. Since the BBN is supposed to represent the
independent assessor’s subjective probability distribution, the analyst must ask the assessor
for the probability values. However, it is well known that the way elicitation is conducted
greatly affects the quality of the results. The assessor may experience several problems due
to unfamiliarity with the method, to the complexity of the task, or to basic limitations of the
human mind:
• unease at having to express uncertainty in terms of probabilities. This affects even
people who are expert in using probabilities in other contexts. It may be true that
everyone has subjective probabilistic beliefs, as the Bayesian methods assume, but we
are certainly not trained to make them explicit. This unease may make it difficult for the
assessor to choose sound procedures for choosing the probabilities;
• strain on one’s attention and concentration, due to the complexity of the dependencies to
be modelled and the sheer size of the tables to be filled;
• difficulty in describing a complex structure that one has never explicitly described in
detail before, for lack of a language like BBNs;
• dependency on simplified ways of describing one’s beliefs, as the one we have applied
here, which may hide from the assessor some complexity of the situation;
• difficulty in deriving proper inference from one’s experience.
The CPTs may thus be unsatisfactory in at least two ways. Firstly there is the obvious risk
that they may be inconsistent (i.e. the probabilities input for some conditional distribution
may not add5 up to 1). Secondly, and more problematic, they may not represent a set of
beliefs that the assessor would find satisfactory after mature reflection. We would normally
expect that the first set of probability values produced by an expert may exhibit this defect,
so iteration will be necessary. Many kinds of checks can be applied to detect defects and
prompt corrections, though of course there is no certain criterion for certifying the absence
of defects. The practical problems arise in deciding which checks to apply, and in which
order, to achieve a reasonably effective combination with reasonable effort by the assessor.
In particular, we would expect that someone who is familiar with using BBNs could apply
checks in a systematic order that attempts to minimise the iterations necessary before the
CPTs appear satisfactory. If instead an assessor is using a BBN for the first time, a more
exploratory procedure may be necessary: the assessor may find it necessary to practice using
the BBN for inference and prediction, even with unsatisfactory CPTs, before attempting to
rectify the CPTs.
                                               
5
 It can easily be shown that the risk of other forms of inconsistency of the marginal and conditional
probability tables used in model construction is removed by the simple requirement that the network
topology should be a-cyclic. It follows from the directed, a-cyclic graph (DAG) topology that the set
of CPTs used to define the BBN model is precisely minimally sufficient to define a coherent joint
probability distribution over the complete node set.
Internal inconsistencies such as cycles in the topology or improper CPTs can be detected
automatically. Actually, tools like Hugin can automatically scale the probabilities entered so
they add up to 1. Of course there is a risk in this kind of functionality: when an inconsistency
occurs, it may be useful to check with the assessor whether the inconsistency was really due
to some error that he or she would wish to rectify. There is evidence that entering
probabilities in the form of odds (“5 to 1 against”) is less subject to errors, for many people,
than entering them as numbers, though we are uncertain as to whether we should expect this
to apply to the elicitation of discrete probability distributions, rather than to only the
probability of a single event.
For all other aspects of poor quality in elicited probabilities, an ample literature has
developed both about the origins of errors in expert judgement and in reasoning with
probabilities, and on ways to correct these errors (see [Strigini, 1994] for some pointers).
The assessor needs to be made aware of possible errors, and given feedback in the form of
different presentations of the implications of his or her supposed beliefs. There is an essential
role to play for an analyst/elicitor, who needs to challenge the expert’s first expression of
probabilities, so as to prompt the expert to see them with fresh eyes, without forcing the
analyst’s own beliefs (beyond the analyst’s beliefs in coherent Bayesian probabilistic
reasoning) on the assessor. Essentially, the assessor is shown some of the implications of his
or her statements, and, if these implications are unsatisfactory, is able to acknowledge an
inconsistency in his or her first description of beliefs and to revise the description to
represent the “true” beliefs. “Truth” need not imply that these beliefs existed in the assessor’s
mind before the elicitation and revision exercise.
In the case of BBNs, it seems that the information that needs checking spans the whole range
from a simple marginal distribution for a root node, to the whole multidimensional
distribution expressed by the BBN. The set of all possible checks is clearly redundant (an
inconsistency between the CPTs and the assessor’s “true” beliefs may be noticed in many
alternative ways). However, it seems that the essential needs are still feedback and prompting
to re-examine the implications of the CPTs. For complex, multidimensional CPTs graphical
feedback appears very useful, as well as dynamic and interactive forms of presentation, like
live electronic documents, maybe even animation of a variety of forms of graphical
projections, an ability to rotate 3D presentations, etc. There are many alternative ways of
presenting specific aspects of a complex distribution, and all of them should in principle be
available.
An assessor may obtain useful feedback from observing:-
• distributions that he or she would consider true before observing some variables (in
formal terms, distributions that are not conditioned on any value of these nodes)
• predictions that the BBN would allow one to derive if certain events were observed (in
formal terms, distributions that are conditioned on the observed event).
However, it is clear that the sheer number of possible forms of feedback is in itself a threat to
effective checks. An analyst should be able to assist the assessor in choosing a few crucial
checks at a time, during the development and successive revision iterations on a BBN. In
principle, it is possible that every new form of feedback will prompt the assessor to revise his
or her previous description of the CPT. This would imply that the BBN was too complex in
the first place. Rather than allowing the assessor to describe a judgement process in
manageable, rigorous terms, the availability of the BBN language has prompted him or her
to seek a level of detail that makes the task mentally unmanageable again.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
The material in this report discusses work in progress within Task 5.1 of DeVa. Our future
plans include both further work on this particular BBN, and work on some of the more
general outstanding problems associated with BBNs. Concerning the present BBN, we intend
to complete the construction exercise. The main outstanding tasks are to complete the first-
pass filling of CPTs for all nodes (by dealing with the Design Process Performance node and
with its two ‘least significant’ parent nodes) and to perform a thorough internal validation,
by assisting the expert in re-examining the completed BBN and its implications, and on this
basis to rectify any discrepancies between the BBN and his or her beliefs (as updated during
this exercise).
For completing the CPTs, our present intention is to retain the current topology of the net,
and tackle the dimensionality problem via some of the techniques mentioned earlier. In
particular, some of the graphical techniques that we have tried look promising. In the event
that this approach does not succeed, we would have to reconsider the topology, perhaps
introducing another node which might allow us to adduce further conditional independence
assumptions. When we have a complete net, including all CPTs, we shall be in a position to
obtain some numerical results using a BBN tool such as Hugin.
We plan to restrict our study of this nuclear example to the present net, and not to attempt a
full BBN for a complete nuclear ‘system important to safety’, such as might form a part of a
safety case: this seems impractical in the time available in the project. However, the DeVa
work will continue to be closely associated with, and benefit from, CSR’s other projects on
BBNs - SERENE and IMPRESS - which are currently examining a number of different
safety-critical applications. A number of general problems in constructing BBNs have arisen
from the these studies, and we intend to investigate these in some detail.
One of the most important issues concerns the validation of a BBN. This has three distinct
aspects. In the first place there are issues such as consistency that are open to automatic
checking, and probably present the least difficulty. Then there are issues concerning the
confidence of the assessor that the BBN actually does capture his or her beliefs about the
system, or class of systems, under examination. Clearly this is not simply a question of
asking whether this is so: instead, the assessor needs support for these judgements at all
stages of the elicitation process. Thus, for example, it would be valuable to have tools that
allow implications of CPTs to be generated easily, so that an assessor can judge whether
these are compatible with his or her beliefs. Some of these tools are currently being produced
by the SERENE project, and DeVa will take advantage of their availability. Finally, there are
the very hard problems concerned with external validation - the question of whether the
‘final’ BBN really does capture the ‘truth’ about the external world (e.g. it makes accurate
predictions of system behaviour). Even leaving aside the issue of experts with false world
pictures, there is the possibility for the process of generating a net to fail, resulting in a net
that imperfectly captures the expert’s correct beliefs without the expert knowing this.
It was clear from an early stage in our work that there is a need for more general guidance
and tool support at all stages in building BBNs. Whilst we have tended to concentrate upon
the difficulties of eliciting complex multivariate probability distributions, even the earlier
task of defining the net topology can be difficult. There is a possibility of progress here
through the use of ‘idioms’ [Neil and Galliers 1997] - essentially small subnet structures that
have been found to be common to BBNs in many application domains. The idea is that an
assessor’s progress in building a net structure can be helped by suggesting to him or her the
possibility of using these building blocks. The assessor can then save the effort that would
otherwise be spent in learning by trial and error convenient representations for these
commonly occurring reasoning patterns.
A major problems in building BBNs, however, tends to be in elicitation of complex CPTs.
We shall continue to examine the approaches that have been outlined briefly earlier,
including means of graphical presentation.
A long term view of the usefulness of BBNs should not only be concerned with the accuracy
of the quantitative results that they produce, important though this is. In many cases BBNs
will be used in circumstances where an assessor currently has available only quite informal
ways of reasoning about a system, based on evidence of disparate types, and using his or her
own expert judgement when direct evidence is missing. A major potential strength of the
BBN approach is that it provides a formal framework in which this reasoning can take place,
facilitating argument and criticism about assumptions and reasoning. The BBN approach will
have been made a useful contribution, for example, if the assessor feels that he or she has
learned something from the exercise that would not have been possible with a less formal
approach; or if the assessor has been able to make explicit, and open to discussion by other
experts, the detailed assumptions and beliefs that went into his or her reasoning. There is
some evidence that this is the case in our example net, even though it is still incomplete.
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